Fa

Professor at the Faculty of Humanities

Department of Philosophy and Logic (2011 - Present)

  • Ph.D. (2011)

    Philosophical Logic

    , Tarbiat Modares University, Iran

  • M.Sc. (2006)

    Islamic Philosophy and Theology

    , University of Esfahan, Iran

  • M.A. (2003)

    Electrical Engineering

    , Isfahan University of Technology, Iran

  • Logic
  • Meta-Metaphysics
  • Metaphysics
  • Islamic (Arabic) Philosophy

    I am a philosopher.

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    Curriculum Vitae (CV)

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    Publications

    Abstract

    Existence as a first-order predicate: Themes from Mirdamad

    D Hosseini
    Journal Paper , , {Pages }

    Abstract

    Abstract

    Mīr Dāmād on essence, existence and priority

    D Hosseini
    Journal Paper , , {Pages }

    Abstract

    Abstract Link

    Quantifier Variance Without Meaning Variance

    Davood Hosseini
    Journal PaperAxiomathes , Volume 30 , Issue 3, 2020 June , {Pages 313-325 }

    Abstract

    Quantifier variance entails that ‘there exists’ has a variety of meanings. Determining what makes all these meanings quantifier meanings is a problem associated with this view (the problem of meaning variance). A reasonable candidate suggested by Hirsch is the set of formal rules governing quantification. However, the collapse argument presents a notorious objection to the viability of the candidate: there cannot be more than one quantifier obeying the same rules up to logical equivalence. It is proposed that a quantifier variantist who intends to retain Hirsch’s proposed solution can admit a many-sorted language in order to block the collapse argument. Within the many-sorted language, a Kaplanian thesis about the rules governing sor

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    Abstract

    Logical Pluralism: Where the Conflict Really Lies

    M Haeri, D Hosseini
    Journal Paper , , {Pages }

    Abstract

    Abstract Link

    Vagueness in the World: A Supervaluationist Approach

    Ali Abasnezhad, Davood Hosseini
    Journal Paper , 2014 January , {Pages 239-255 }

    Abstract

    A na?ve perspective on the world suggests that the world we live in is full of vague objects. In this chapter, a version of the supervaluationist framework will be proposed to provide a systematic conception of such a na?ve perspective. Precisifications of a vague object will be characterized as objects that, were they actual objects, every determinate truth about the vague object would be true about them. It will be argued that this view is more effective than other versions of supervaluationism at accommodating commonsensical and metaphysical considerations. The view leaves room for vague identity as a kind of “no fact of the matter.” Thus, Evans’ argument against ontic vagueness fails in a natural way.

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    Teaching

    Current Teaching

    • MS.c.

      Mathematical Logic

    • MS.c.

      Metaphysics

    • Ph.D.

      Model Theory

    • Ph.D.

      -

    Teaching History

    • MS.c.

      History of Analytic Philosophy

    • MS.c.

      History of Modern Logic

    • MS.c.

      Introduction to Set Theory

    • MS.c.

      Meta-Metaphysics

    • Ph.D.

      Proof Theory

    People

    • 2020
      Moosavi Jashni, Seyed Amir Mohammad
      Davidson and Putnam Debate on Conceptual Schemes and its Relation to Epistemic Nihilism
    • 2021
      Foroughi, Parsa
    • 2019
      Jafari, Javid
      Model-Theoretic Inferentialism, Non-determinism and Formal Inconsistency

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